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Rational Speculators and Exchange Rate Volatility

I. Introduction
A strong correlation seems to exist between trading volume and price volatility in
major currency markets (Baillie and Bollerslev 1991, Dacorogna, et al. 1993, Ito et al. 1996).
Evidence for such a correlation is also abundant for major equity and bond markets (Cornell
1981, Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen 1992). Some observers claim that speculative activity
induces both the high volume and the volatility, while others claim that this cannot be so.
The classic statement of the latter position comes from Milton Friedman (1953, p.175):
"People who have argued that speculation can be destabilizing seldom realize that this is
largely equivalent to saying that speculators lose money, since speculation can be
destabilizing in general only if speculators sell when the currency is low in price and buy
when it is high." He also points out that speculators who regularly lose money this way will
be driven out of the market by speculators with more successful strategies. In sum,
Friedman's position is that only rational speculators will survive in the market, and that
rational speculation cannot be destabilizing.
Important policy issues hinge on the resolution of this debate. The elimination of
capital controls in Europe has coincided with a renewal of intra-ERM turbulence which
threatens the viability of the EMU. Viewing this as the result of heightened speculative
activity, some observers have argued for the reimposition of capital controls, if only on an
as-needed basis (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1995). Others with a similar view of
speculative activity have argued for the imposition of a foreign-exchange turnover tax (Tobin
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1974; Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz 1994). If Friedman is right, however, a policyinduced reduction of speculative flows would increase foreign exchange volatility, worsening
rather than improving the situation.
This paper shows that rational speculators can but need not increase exchange rate
volatility and that, contrary to Friedman's (1953) argument, the circumstances under which
they might increase volatility are plausible. An examination of Friedman's line of reasoning
reveals that it does not incorporate interest rates or risk, both crucial factors for many
speculators when they choose the size and direction of their positions. For example,
changing interest differentials across countries can lead rational speculators to buy currency
even when its price is "high," driving the exchange rate even higher, or sell when it is "low,"
driving the exchange rate even lower, in this way "destabilizing" the exchange rate.
The result is derived in a straightforward model of the foreign exchange market with
two types of traders: "speculators" and "current account traders."

Our speculators are

rational and fully informed. Current account traders are analogous to liquidity traders in
standard fmance models, who can be interpreted realistically in the foreign exchange context
as importers and exporters of goods and services.
We find that speculators' effect on exchange rate volatility varies according to the
types of shocks hitting the market, and we divide these shocks into two categories. Some
shocks, such as changes in liquidity demand, do not affect speculators' preferred portfolio
positions directly. An increase in speculation will dampen the exchange-rate impact of these
shocks, consistent with Friedman's view. Other shocks, such as changes of interest rates or
risks, do directly change speculators' preferred portfolio positions. As more speculators are
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introduced into the market, their total reaction to these shocks increases, inducing a rise in
the exchange rate's reaction to the shock -- an outcome entirely at variance with Friedman's
view. These mixed effects of speculators on exchange rate volatility sort themselves out
according to the level of speculative activity. At low levels of speculative activity, the
Friedman effect dominates and the introduction of more speculators reduces exchange rate
volatility; at high levels the reverse is true.
The results of the paper support Rood and Taylor's (1995) observation that there may
be "speculative forces at work in the foreign exchange market that are not reflected in the
usual menu of macroeconomic fundamentals" (p. 9). In particular, the results suggest that
the fundamental determinants of exchange rate dynamics include microstructural factors such
as the extent of speculative activity.
By pointing to the potential importance of microstructural factors in exchange rate
dynamics, our results could potentially help explain the increase in real and nominal
exchange rate volatility following the industrial world's 1973 shift to floating exchange rates.
Evidence provided in Rood and Rose (1992) and Baxter and Stockman (1989) strongly
suggests that this change cannot be explained by increased volatility among underlying
macroeconomic variables. The results of the present paper suggest that the enormous
increase in speculative activity since 1973 could provide an alternative explanation.
Our analysis also suggests a possible explanation of the strong high-frequency
connections between the activity of speculators and financial price volatility (such as that
highlighted by Ito et al. 1996). French and Roll (1986) divide the possible explanations for
these observed connections into three groups, one which relies on public information, one
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which relies on private infonnation, and a third which relies on pricing errors. Our analysis
suggests a fourth explanation, orthogonal to these original three: a rise in speculative activity
could fundamentally affect financial price dynamics, even controlling for infonnation
availability and assuming rational pricing, by changing the way prices respond to
infonnation.
The conclusion that speculators can increase financial price volatility is certainly not
new. Numerous examples of destabilizing speculation were developed in response to
Friedman's claim. Early suggestions came from Baumol (1957), Stein (1961), and Farrell
(1966). More recently, Hart and Kreps (1986) show that "speculative activity in an economy
in which all agents are rational, have identical priors, and have access to identical
infonnation may destabilize prices, under any reasonable definition of stabilization" (p. 927).
Likewise, Stein (1987) shows that "introducing a new group of speculators into the spot
market for a commodity can destabilize prices" (p. 1124), even when speculators are fully
infonned and have rational expectations. Hau (1995) shows that speculators could increase
exchange rate volatility if individual exchange rate expectations differ.
Though the mechanisms higWighted in these earlier papers are all plausible, many
rely on a set of narrowly defined circumstances that may not be present in reality. For
example, the Hart and Kreps (1986) model requires a very specific relationship between
stochastic consumption behavior and signals about that behavior. Stein's (1987) model
requires that the new group of speculators introduced to the market have access to an
infonnation source unavailable to the original speculators. The mechanism higWighted here,
by contrast, will always operate in foreign exchange markets, so long as speculators concern
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themselves with interest rates as well as expected exchange-rate changes. Analogous
mechanisms can also be found in other financial markets. In stock and commodity markets,
for example, changes in the domestic interest rates will directly affect speculators and could
cause them to destabilize rather than stabilize prices.
Non-rational speculators could also destabilize financial prices, as shown in a group
of papers including Frankel and Froot (1990) and De Long, Schleifer, Summers and
Waldmann (1990). Though the present paper is concerned with rational speculators, its
results are not inconsistent with these important papers.
This paper does not address the welfare implications of speculative behavior. Though
there is a presumption among naive observers that increased volatility reduces welfare,
academics have noted repeatedly that the reverse could be true (see, for example, Stein
[1987]). Since the welfare of non-speculative agents is not modeled explicitly here, the
paper focuses exclusively on the implications of speculative activity for exchange rate
dynamics, without considering whether changes in those dynamics benefit or harm welfare.

In Section II, we develop and solve the model. Section ill analyzes the dynamics
associated with specific types of shocks and Section IV shows how the degree of speculation
affects the overall exchange-rate volatility. A few extensions are considered in Section V
and Section VI concludes.

II.

The Model
Our model involves two types of agents, liquidity traders and rational speculators, and

is driven by two types of exogenous shocks, those that affect goods and services trade and
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those that affect interest differentials. Similar models are used in Osler (1995), which
considers the impact of speculators' horizons on exchange rate dynamics, and Osler (1997),
which considers the impact of short-term speculators on the propagation of exchange rate
shocks. The model used here differs critically from these previous models, however, since
it includes interest differentials. We fIrst describe the two types of agents, and then describe
the balance of payments equilibrium condition through which they interact. We fInish this
section by summarizing the solution to the model (the solution algorithm is presented in the
appendix).
A. Types of Traders.
Current ACCOUlit Traders. In the asset-pricing literature it is by now common for

models to include "liquidity" traders, who buy and sell the asset in question for purposes
unconnected with speculation. These agents are sometimes modeled as having demands
which are linear in the level of the asset price in question plus a random disturbance term
(see, for example, Dow and Gorton, 1993). In the foreign-exchange market these agents are
immediately recognizable as importers and exporters, who maximize profIts from trading
goods and services. Though they could engage in speculation, these agents generally choose
not to do so, reasoning that their expertise in this area is limited. In effect, they take potential
losses from failing to speculate as an opportunity cost of pursuing their chosen line of
business.

We will discuss these agents as if they entirely abstain from speculating, which

is not a bad approximation to their actual behavior, in aggregate.
interpretation is not critical:

However, this

the model can be interpreted in a way which includes

speculation by these agents, as will be discussed below.
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In representing these agents in our model we leave their profit-maximizing decision

in the background, and focus on an abstract interpretation of their associated currency
demand. Their demands for currency are, therefore, determined predominantly by the level
of the exchange rate and by factors unconnected to the exchange rate which appear random,
from the perspective of the rest of the market. Let et denote the log of the domestic price of
foreign currency. Domestic importers and/or foreign exporters will buy foreign currency
with domestic currency. When the foreign currency appreciates, or et rises, some or all of
the appreciation will be passed through to higher import prices (measured in domestic
currency), leading to declines in both import volume and foreign currency demand. Foreign
importers and/or domestic exporters will supply foreign exchange and their supply in
response to exchange rate changes will depend on the extent of the pass through and on the
price elasticity of exports.
The net current-account/liquidity demand for foreign currency is defined as the
difference between importers' demand and exporters' supply, or
(1)

where C and S are constant and

Et

is a random shock. S is assumed to be positive, so that

an appreciation of the foreign currency (higher et ) lowers the net liquidity demand for foreign
currency. The random shock is intended to summarize all factors other than the exchange
rate that alter net foreign currency demand from current account traders, such as barriers to
trade, price levels, and military engagements.

These influences could very well be

intertemporally correlated and need not be stationary. One can think of CAt as the current
account of the foreign country.l
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If the exchange rate, in the absence of any speculation, had to adjust to keep the

current account equal to zero, then from equation (1),
el

= e

+ £1

(2)

where e - CIS is the exchange rate that makes CAl = 0 in the absence of shocks. On the
assumption that the expected value of el is zero, we will call e the long-run equilibrium
exchange rate. 2

Rational speculators. Speculators represent a broad class of agents who exploit
exchange-rate changes to make profits. This group includes interbank traders, foreignexchange mutual-fund managers, and individual currency speculators. The group also
includes managers of international bond funds and other portfolio managers who invest
internationally. The primary characteristics of these agents are (i) they invest internationally
in interest-bearing securities or loans and thereby incur exchange risk and (ii) they are paid
according to the profits they make by investing funds which, in most cases, they do not own.
To reflect these attributes of the model's speculators it is natural to adopt what has
become a convention among modelers in the theoretical asset-pricing literature: speculators
have a constant absolute risk aversion utility function,

(3)
where 1t1. , represents an individual speculator's profits. To earn these profits the speculator
takes a bet each period by establishing a position of size hI' which is measured in units of
foreign currency. The optimal bet, to be derived shortly, depends on expected profits.
Actual profits are defined as follows: for every unit of currency bet, the speculator earns the
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change in the log of the exchange rate, el+) - ep plus the short-term interest differential across
countries:
(4)

where 0,;: i,* - i, denotes the excess of the foreign interest rate i f over the domestic interest
rate i,. (Note that our central conclusions are not driven by the fact that interest rates affect
speculators but not current account traders. See Carlson and Osler, 1996.) It will be
assumed that speculators are not limited in the size of their position, be they short or long.
Under the assumption, to be examined later, that profits are distributed conditionally
normally, speculators who maximize expected utility will behave as if they are maximizing
the welfare function
(5)

where £,(1t1+ 1) denotes the expected level,

Var(~+I)

denotes the variance of a speculator's

next-period profits conditional on information available at time t, and

e denotes

a

speculator's level of absolute risk aversion. The optimal bet will be proportional to expected
profits and inversely proportional to risk aversion and risk itself:

(6)
where

(7)
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Var(et+l) is the expected variance of the exchange rate conditional on information at time t.

Later, when we solve explicitly for the exchange rate and for its variability, the conditional
variance will be seen to depend on parameters generating the shocks. Since we are dealing
with a standard utility function it is not surprising that the linear form of this bet function is
also standard in the theoretical asset-pricing literature.
If there are N such speculators, their desired portfolio holdings can be written:

(8)
Changes in Bt can be viewed as the foreign country's capital account. A positive change (B

t-

BI _I > 0) is a capital flow from the domestic to the foreign country.3 Note that N need not be

interpreted literally as the number of speculators. Instead, we can view N as a measure of
total hours spent on speculative activity per period, where some of those hours could be
associated with speculative activity of current account traders.
It is convenient to re-express the capital account as follows:

(9)
The parameter Qt

==

Nq I represents a measure of total speculative trading in the foreign

exchange market.
B. Market Solution.
Assume floating exchange rates and no intervention by central banks in the foreign
exchange market. Consequently, the exchange rate adjusts to maintain the following balance
of payments equation:

CAt + Br - Bt_1 = O.

(10)
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A well-known but important point to note is that there must be a current-account surplus or
deficit in order for speculators to make any change in their net holdings of foreign assets.
Note that this equilibrium condition requires flow equilibrium in the foreign
exchange market. Models which relied on this equilibrium condition, the Mundell-Fleming
model in particular, fell out of favor with the advent of asset market models in the 1970s, but
the primary shortcoming of the earlier models was an absence of maximizing behavior on
the part of speculative agents. This problem is not shared by the present model, however,
since, as indicated by equations (6) and (7), our utility-maximizing speculators must be
satisfied with their stock position in foreign exchange each period. A renewed appreciation
of the importance of flow equilibrium in currency markets was forcefully advocated as early
as Kouri (1981), and more recently by Lyons [1995] and Goodhart [1988]. This condition
has been included in some relatively recent works (Bhattacharya and Weller [1993], Lyons
[1995]). The importance of flow is further underlined by its centrality to the profit-making
strategies of interbank traders. 4
Substituting from (1) and (9) into this balance of payments equation and collecting
terms, we have

(11)

For convenience we define the change in the interest rate differential as follows: 6 r

;: 0r-or_\. We will take 6 ras the second source of exogenous shocks to this foreign exchange
market. s
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Assuming that N, S,

e, and the variances and covariances of the exogenous shocks

are constant, we can find a solution in which Var(e/+ 1) is constant. In that case, Q/ must also
be a constant. Our procedure, with technical details shown in the appendix, will be to
assume a constant Q and solve equation (11) for e, as a function of e/_ I , current shocks, and
projections of future shocks. We ignore bubble solutions. With the solution for (11) we can
readily determine the unique constant conditional variance of the exchange rate and study
how different values of parameters affect that variance.
To maintain our focus on the issue of whether speculation is stabilizing, we initially
consider the special case in which the shocks are independent of each other and of all past
shocks, and all future shocks have zero expected values. 6 More general possibilities are
examined in Section V.
With these base assumptions, the exchange rate's dynamics can be written:

= J...e 1

+

(1-J...)e

+

(l-J...)£

1+1

+

~~
I-J...

1

+

1+1

(12)

where

q> -

Jq>2

- 1 ,

q>

-

S
2Q

(13)

is the smaller root of the characteristic equation:

P- (2+S/Q)t.. + 1 = O.

(14)

As shown in the appendix. there is a unique solution for Q, t.., and Var(e,) as functions
of N, S,

e, Var(£), and Var(~).

Since our equilibrium exchange rate generating process is

linear in the shocks, it is sufficient to assume that the shocks are normally distributed -- as
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we do henceforth -- to conclude that the exchange rate itself will be normally distributed, as
required earlier. Had we chosen to examine a nonlinear equilibrium, this property of
normalcy might not have held.
Note that A, a positive fraction, is close to zero when Q is close to zero and
approaches one as Q is very large. Since A and Q are monotonically related, and since Q is
a measure of speculative activity as discussed earlier, we will follow the dictates of analytical
convenience and treat Aas our measure of speculative activity for the remainder of the paper.

III.

Speculation and Market Dynamics
Before presenting an expression for the variability of the exchange rate, which we do

in Section IV, it is worth pausing to gain a better understanding of exchange rate dynamics
by considering the market response to each type of shock. We first consider how fullyinformed rational speculators perform their function of offsetting an unanticipated transitory
current-account shock. We then show how the market reacts to an unanticipated change in
the interest-rate differential.

A. Transitory Trade Shocks

Suppose at time t there is a transitory trade shock of SEt and no interest-differential
shock. For intuitive convenience, assume we enter the period with the exchange rate at its
long-run equilibrium, speculators' outstanding positions at zero, and the interest differential
at zero. In this case equation (12) becomes:
(15)
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By way of comparison, note that the exchange rate would be et = e + E t in the
absence of speculators. Thus the initial impact of a trade shock (E) is smaller when
speculators are present than when they are absent. In this sense, speculators can be said to
stabilize the exchange rate in response to current-account shocks, just as described by
Friedman (1953).
To understand why rational speculators temper the exchange rate's response to a
transitory trade shock, imagine the fIrst speculator to observe this market. 7 If the speculator
refrained from entering the market, s/he would rationally expect the exchange rate to fall

-

-

from e + E, back to e in the next period. This implies a profit-making opportunity, to take
advantage of which the speculator would sell foreign currency. Those very sales would put
downward pressure on the exchange rate, as a result of which the exchange rate would
initially rise by less than E -- say by (I-X)E , where x < 1.
The speculator's presence will affect not only the initial exchange rate, but also those
of subsequent periods. For example, in the next period the speculator will need to repurchase
the foreign exchange in order to realize profIts, putting sufficient upward pressure on the
exchange rate to raise it above its unconditional mean. Once again, if the speculator took no
position between the second and third periods, the speculator would rationally anticipate that
the exchange rate would decline to its unconditional mean. The natural choice is again to
take a short position in anticipation of such a decline (though in this second round s/he will
sell a smaller amount, since the anticipated exchange-rate decline is smaller). Through this
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process the speculator affects all future exchange rates, though to a progressively smaller
degree.
In a full rational expectations equilibrium, with multiple speculators, the speculators
•

will take account of their aggregate effect on exchange rate dynamics. (It is this equilibrium
that we describe with equation (12) or, in more general cases, with equation (A.8) in the
appendix.) In response to a trade shock of SE the exchange rate will initially rise by (l-A)E.
A summarizes the amount of smoothing pressure exerted by speculative activity, which is
determined by the total amount of speculator sales in response to the shock. This selling
pressure depends, in tum, on the number of speculators, their risk aversion, and the exchange
rate's (endogenous) volatility.
Our risk-averse speculators will hold a short position in foreign currency only if they
expect to be rewarded for that risk. Their risk premium can be defined as the expected
excess returns on a foreign currency posistion. From equations (6) and (7),
(l6)
The risk premium is proportional to three factors: (1) the outstanding stock of
foreign currency held per speculator at time t ,bl ; (2) speculators' risk aversion, 6; (3) the
exchange rate's conditional variability. The presence of all of these factors is consistent with
many standard models.
If speculators are risk neutral (6 = 0), they will take whatever positions are necessary
to

drive the risk premium close to zero. If speculators are risk averse, then the risk premium

will be time-varying. What causes these variations, however, is not necessarily changes in
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the inherent riskiness of one currency relative to another, or changes in risk aversion, our
standard suspects. In addition to these factors, variations in risk premia are driven by
changes in the profit opportunities facing speculators: these agents take positions whenever
shocks to the foreign exchange market create opportunities for speculative profits, with the
size of those positions and equilibrium risk premiums jointly determined period-by-period.

B. Interest-Rate Differential Shocks.
Now consider how the market reacts to a change in interest rates. Assume once again
that, up through period t-l, the exchange rate was at its long-run equilibrium and the interest
differential was zero. Assuming as well that there are no trade shocks, equation (12)
becomes:

et

= e

+

~~
I-A

t

(17)

A rise in the amount of speculative activity (higher Q and higher A), will increase the
exchange rate's response to the shock. Thus for interest-rate shocks, additional speculators
do 11Q1 playa stabilizing role. This contrasts sharply with the way speculators subdue the
exchange rate's response to trade shocks, discussed earlier.
Where does this destabilizing influence come from?

A simple, model-free

explanation points to the fact that speculators may deviate from conventional wisdom and
buy when the exchange rate is "high" or sell when it is "low"(in each case relative to its
unconditional mean), when interest rate differentials suggest that there are profits to be made.

•
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For a more model-specific explanation, it is helpful to begin with an understanding
of the system's overall response to an interest shock. Suppose that interest differentials and
speculators' positions begin at zero, and there is a positive shock ~t > 0, so that

& = 4.,

while trade shocks remain zero. Other things equal, the rise in foreign relative to domestic
interest rates will cause speculators to increase their holdings of foreign assets. In trying to
purchase additional currency they will bid up the price, inducing a corresponding supply
from current-account traders.
After the exchange rate's initial rise to the shock, speculators must expect a future
fall in the value of foreign currency (e t ) since the long-run exchange rate in our example does
not change. By taking the expected value of equation (12) at time 1 and re-arranging tenns
we can show that the expected exchange rate decline next period is proportional to the gap
between the current exchange rate and its long run value:
(18)

This decline is, of course, determined by speculators' continued equilibrium
adjustments to the shock. According to equation (6), their new long-tenn desired foreign
currency holdings will be qOt. Initially, however, they acquire only a part of that position
because the expected return on foreign assets is less than the foreign interest rate (by the
amount of expected depreciation). 8 Speculators slowly raise their foreign assets towards that
long-run desired level. Those same additional purchases are the force that sustains the
foreign currency's short-run value above its long-run equilibrium value. The currency
declines monotonically because speculators purchase a slightly smaller amount each period.
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Once speculators have taken a new foreign currency position in any period, they must
expect to be rewarded for carrying that position. The risk premium in our specific example
with 0/ =~/ will be proportional to the interest differential itsele
(19)
(20)

Having described the model's response to an interest differential shock we can now
examine how the system responds to an increase in speculative activity. Suppose there is a
rise in N, the number of speculators, or a decline in the risk aversion of a given population
of speculators. In each case, other things equal, there will be a greater speculative response
to a given interest shock. There will be more speculators trying to achieve a position of qo/,
or, alternatively, the total desired increase in foreign currency holdings for a given population
of speculators will be higher because the new desired long-run position of each speculator
will be greater.
This captures intuitively the reason why a rise in speculative activity increases the
exchange rate's response to an interest shock. Of course, the system's overall response is
substantially more complex than suggested so far. Most importantly, the exchange rate's
variance adjusts endogenously, as discussed in Section
speculators to adjust their bet coefficients.

rv, below, and this

in tum causes

Once these endogenous adjustments work

themselves out, however, an exogenous rise in speculative activity ultimately leads to higher

Q, higher A, and a stronger initial exchange rate response to an interest differential shock.
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IV.

Speculation and Exchange Rate Volatility
We are now ready to examine how the amount of speculative activity influences the

conditional variance of the exchange rate. We ftrst compute the conditional variance of the
exchange rate based on equation (12). At time t+ 1 the only new information comes from f;+l
and ~t+l' so the unexpected exchange rate change will be

(21)

This allows us to calculate the conditional variance directly:

(22)

assuming E and ~ are uncorrelated.
From this expression, and the monotonic relationship between A. and N mentioned
earlier, we can infer a number of important aspects of the relationship between
speculative activity and exchange rate volatility:
1.

If only current-account shocks occur, with

Var(~t+l)

= 0, then the conditional

variance of the exchange rate declines monotonically with the amount of
speculation. In the limit, as A. approaches one, the conditional variance goes to
zero.
2.

If only interest-rate shocks occur, with Var(E t+1) = 0, then the conditional variance

of the exchange rate increases monotonically with the amount of speculation. As
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speculative activity rises, and A. approaches one, the conditional variance becomes
arbitrarily large.
3.

If both types of shocks occur, then, as speculative activity increases and A. rises

from zero, the conditional variance of the exchange rate first falls, reaches a
minimum, and then rises without limit.
4.

Denote by A. * the A. at which the conditional variance is at a minimum. From
equations (6) and (7) we can also see that an individual speculator's optimal
position varies inversely with Var(e'+l)' This means at low levels A. -- and thus
with little speculation -- an individual speculator's position and expected profits
rise as additional speculators enter the market. These reach a maximum when
speculative activity is such that A. = A. *, and then fall as speculative activity
continues to increase.

V.

Extensions

In our analysis so far we have used just one measure of volatility and assumed that
all shocks are independently and identically distributed with zero means. In this section, we
introduce other measures of volatility that have appeared in the literature and consider how
different patterns of shocks might alter the impact of added speculation. The results indicate
that variations in measures of volatility or in patterns of shocks do not change our conclusion
that speculation can be destabilizing.
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A. Other Measures of Volatility

Delon g et al. (1990) use the distance of the exchange rate from its "funda
mental" in
their three-period model as their measure of whether and how much specul
ators destabilize
prices. In an infinite-period model such as the one presented here this
is analogous to using
the unconditional variance of the price level: E [e1+1 -

e]

2.

The conditional variance we used

in the prior section represents the unexpected movements in the exchan
ge rate that makes
speculation risky. The unconditional variance is a measure of the overal
l wanderings of the
exchange rate and is the sort of statistic that many econo mists exami
ne when trying to
characterize market behavior.
In the two-period model of Stein (1987), price stability is measured
in terms of the

effect of speculators on period-2 price changes. In focusing on price
changes, we can look
at either the conditional or unconditional variance of the change. The
conditional variance
of the change in the exchange rate, E,[e 1+1 - e,]2, differs from the condit
ional variance ofthe
exchange rate, Var(e '+1)

= E,[e1+1

- E, e 1+1 ]2, whenever the exchange rate next period is

expected to differ from its current level.
The unconditional variance of the change in the excha nge rate E [e
1+1

-

e,]

2 IS

a

statistic that is of interest to economists when there are trends in the exchan
ge rate and the
unconditional variance of the exchange rate's level is undefined.
It is often computed
empirically when the "fundamental" is changing in unknown ways.
For each of these equally reasonable definitions of exchange-rate volatil
ity, there are
at least two approaches to considering whether speculation is destab
ilizing. Stein (1987)
essentially looks at the "marginal" effects of speculation, asking wheth
er the introduction of
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one new speculator (or a group of new speculators) changes price volatility if some
speculators were already active in the market. Alternatively, one might be interested in the
"average" effects of speculation, that is, whether volatility is higher or lower with some
speculators than with none.
In the case of independent and identically distributed mean-zero shocks, all of these

measures of volatility yield the same falling-then-rising pattern as the level of speculative
activity increases. In fact, the minimum variance also occurs at the same value of A. For
example, the u,nconditional variance of the exchange rate is shown in the appendix to be:
- 2

E[e,+) - e]

:::

(I-A)

A2

I

--Var(e) +
--Var(~)
(1 +A)
(1-A)2 I-I.?

(23)

The pattern with regard to increases in speculative activity -- and A-- is precisely the same
as it is with the conditional variance. The only difference is that the variability attributable
to each of the shocks has been magnified by a factor of 1/(1-1..2 ).

B. Autocorrelated Current-Account Shocks
Most shocks that affect demand for currency are autocorrelated to some degree. A
rise in real income in one country that raises demand for the exports of the other country will
certainly last a while. Likewise a rise in one country's price level will tend to have a fairly
lasting effect on demand for exports and currency of the other country. To capture this
possibility we can modify the structure of the disturbances to the current-account sector of
the model to make those disturbances autocorrelated. Specifically, suppose the disturbance,
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originally the mean zero i.i.d. variable ~, is instead an AR( 1) variable
with a mean zero i.i.d.
disturbance, wr :
(24)
where 0 < p < 1. In that case, the exchange rate's conditional variance
can be shown to be:

(25)

When p =0, this reduces to the conditional variance in the basic model
, presented as (22).
Higher values of p increase the coefficient on

Wt+l

and hence increase variability attributable

to current account shocks. This is because when a shock occurs, the
market reacts not only
to the new current value of £r+l but also takes into account how the shock
affects expected
future values.
The pattern of exchange rate volatility falling and then rising as specul
ation increases
is stilI the same as before. The variability attributable to current-account
shocks approaches
a lower bound of zero while the variability attributable to interest-rate
shocks becomes
arbitrarily large. This pattern is true of other measures of volatility as well
because, at higher
values of A., the rising impact of the interest-rate shocks always eventually
of these claims is available from the authors upon request.)

dominates. (Proof
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C.

Mean-Revertin~

Interest Rates

Our original specification assumed that the interest-rate differential has a unit root.
While this is consistent with some empirical analyses, it would seem worthwhile nonetheless
to check the implications of relaxing this assumption. Specifically, let us assume instead that
the interest rate differential follows a stationary AR(1) process with first-order
autocorrelation coefficient a and mean-zero i.i.d. disturbance 11,:

0, =a 0'_1 + 11,

(26)

with 0 < a < 1. If the current-account shocks are again assumed to be i.i.d. with zero
mean, the exchange rate now has the following solution:

Ae,

+

(1-A)~

+

(1-1..)£'+1 + I_ACtA 11'+1

(27)

The exchange-rate dynamics under the random-walk hypothesis for the interestrate differential considered earlier can be seen to hold in (27) when a = 1. Less
persistence is represented by lower values of a and there are now two terms to consider,
one associated with 11 ,+1 and a second associated with 0,. To understand why the
coefficient on the latter is negative, keep in mind that, with mean reversion, a high current
interest-rate differential means declining differentials over the future. This, in tum,
implies that speculators will be planning concurrent decreases in their holdings of foreign
exchange. A smaller value of a makes the effect stronger becaus~ the mean reversion
occurs more rapidly.
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A positive current interest-differential shock 111+1>0 still raises the exchange rate
but the effect is monotonically related to the value of a. In the limit, as a goes to zero
and the interest-rate differentials are entirely transitory (i.e., 8, =11,), there is still an initial
impact of 111+1 on the exchange rate but that effect is completely reversed the next period.
We can use (27) to calculate the conditional variance

(28)

The pattern still holds of the variance first falling and then rising as A increases. So,
beyond a critical amount of speculation, increased speculative activity will increase
exchange rate variability even with mean-reverting interest-rate differentials. (Note that,
for ex < 1, it is no longer true that the coefficient on the interest-differential shocks -- and
the potential effect of speculators on exchange rate volatility -- becomes arbitrarily large
as A approaches 1.)

VI.

Conclusions
This paper has developed a model highlighting a structural connection between

rational speculative activity and exchange-rate volatility based on plausible
circumstances. The source of speculators' potentially destabilizing influence is their
direct response to certain types of shocks, such as interest rate changes. Other shocks to
which speculators will respond directly would include changes in taxes and transactions
costs, changes in perceived risk, or changes in their own risk aversion. Unlike the
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speculation-volatility connections suggested by French and Roll (1986), the one
suggested here does not rely on informational asymmetries between speculators and other
agents. Instead, it suggests that the presence of speculators changes the exchange rate's
response to given shocks.
The model also shows that rational speculators tend to smooth the effects of
certain types of exchange rate shocks-specifically shocks which do not directly affect
speculators' desired positions, such as shocks to international trade. When these are the
only shocks, speculators who expect (say) a future exchange-rate appreciation will buy
foreign exchange immediately, and sell it later, thereby smoothing the price exactly as
described by Friedman (1953) in his discussion of speculators' effects on flexible
exchange rates. We have shown, however, that there may be times when speculators will
buy when the exchange rate is "high"and sell when it is "low" (in each case relative to its
unconditional mean), contrary to Friedman's description and yet fully consistent with
rationality.
Finally, the model has the property that as the level of speculative activity rises,
the variance in the exchange rate falls for small amounts of speculation. However,
beyond some point more speculation will increase the variance of the exchange rate and
hence destabilize the market.
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Notes

1. We have called these actors current-account traders but some capital account transactions might belong here.
Anyone whose currency demand is influenced by relative prices should be incorporated into this net demand. For
example, decisions about direct investment may be influenced by the level of the real exchange rate.
2. This stylized interpretation of the exchange rate does not include any permanent shocks, which may strike some
observers as contrary to facts. Including permanent shocks would not substantially affect our central conclusions.
The exchange rate without speculators would be determined as follows: e, =e + £, + W, , where W, follows a random
walk. The behavior of speculators (to be described later) would be only trivially affected by the inclusion of w,
(their average absolute bet would decline). What matters for speculators is the expected exchange rate change and
the exchange rate's variability conditional on available information. A nonzero value of w, can be interpreted, in this
context, as a change in the underlying equilibrium (a change in e), which speculators will take into account in
choosing their positions.
3. Here again, the distinction between current account and capital account agents is not as c1earcur as suggested by
the text. It is certainly possible that expected future exchange rate movements may influence some of the currency
purchases of goods and services traders. A more general interpretation of the model incorporates this possibility.
Specifically, we can interpret 5 as a measure of the sensitivity of currency demand to relative prices, from whatever
the source of such sensitivity; likewise, we can interpret Nq as a measure of the sensitivity of currency demand to
expected excess returns, from whatever the source of such sensitivity.
4. This point is stressed in Lyons [1995], in discussing how traders use information on customers' market-orders.
Another example: with a large stop-loss order a trader begins execution before the price actually reaches the
exchange rate level specified by the order itself. The trader is counting on pressure from the order to push the
exchange rate through and beyond the specified rate; in this way the trader can bring the average execution rate close
to the specified rate.

5. This assumption implicitly sets interest rates as exogenous. Though reasonable for central bank intervention
rates, the assumption may seem unrealistic for other rates that may matter for speculation. The results of the model
are unchanged, however, if we allow interest rates to be determined partially endogenously. All that is required is
that there be some shock affecting interest rates that is exogenous to the rest of the model.

6. In our model, the long-run behavior of the exchange rate depends on what happens to C + 5£/ over time. None of
our fundamental results require the stationarity of C + 5£,. We assume stationarity to simplify our exposition.

7. The susbsequent analysis draws heavily on Osler (1997).
8. Speculators' long-run desired foreign currency holdings equals q ~, because, once the exchange rate reaches its
long-run value and is no longer expected to change, ~, is the expected excess return on foreign currencies, while q is
their desired holdings per unit of excess return.

9. In the limit, when speculative activity as measured by Q becomes arbitrarily large and A. converges to unity, there
is no risk premium at all and the exchange rate satisfies uncovered interest parity.

Appendix
A.I. Derivation of the solution for the model
The solution begins with equation (11) from the text, which we repeat here for
convenience as (A. 1):
Ee
e - e,-I I
, ,-I - (l+S/Q)e - Q'-l[E
Q, ,-1,

t,

(A. 1)

Taking Q'.l = Q, = Q and setting X, = [C + SE, + Q(OI-O,)]lQ we get:

= - XI

(A.2)

In their appendix to Chapter 5, Blanchard and Fisher (1989) show how to solve this sort of
equation both by the method of undetenruned coefficients and by the factorization method. We
follow the factorization method here.
Take expectations of (A.2) as of time t-I, denote by F the forward operator which
increases the date on e but not the date on the expectations operator E, and denote by L

=F

l

the

lag operator that decreases the date on e but does not change the date of the expectations
operator. Then collect tenns:
[F 2

-

(2+S/Q)F

+

1] L Et-le,

(A.3)

By factorization:

(A.4)

where A is the smaller root of the characteristic equation: 1..2

-

(2 + S/Q)A + 1 =O.

Multiply (A4) through by -tJ(1-"AF) and expand to get:

~

Ae l _ 1

AL EI_1XI+)

+

+

CA- I

(A5)

)=0

where C is an arbitrary constant. With the assumption that there are no explosive bubbles, C =0.
Use (A.5) to substitute in (A2) for E,_1e, and, with a suitable change in the time index, for E,e,+ 1 .
After collecting terms and imposing C =0, one gets:
~

(l-A+SIQ)e l

(1-A)et-l

+ XI +

~

L

A)+IE((I+I+) -

)=0

AL )jEt_1XI+)

(A6)

)=0

From the factorization, the sum of the roots can be written A. + 1/A. =2 + SIQ, and so:

I - A

S
Q

+ -

I _ I

=

A

I-A

A

(A?)

Also,

S
Q

I _ 2
A

+

A

(A8)

This means that

A
I-A

Q
(1-A)-

(A.9)

S

From (A?) and (A8),
(I-A) Q
(l-A+SIQ)

S

(AW)

Multiply both sides of (A6) by (AI 0), and note that (I-A)2Q/S = A, to
get

(All)

Replace X t by (C + SEt + Q~t)Q, where ~t ==Ot - at_I' let e=C/S , and again
note that
Q/S

=AI( 1- Ai for the result:

(AI2)

A.II. Indep enden tly and Identically Distributed Shocks With Zero Mean
s
On the assumption that Et_1Et+j

et

=

Ae t _ 1

+

= EtEt+j = Et_l~t+j = EA+j =0, (A.12) reduces to:
-

(I-A)e

+

(1-A)£
t

A
I-A

+ --~
t

(AI3)

This is shown in the text for period t+ 1 as equation (12).
For the moving average representation, multiply (Al3) through by (I-A
L)"I to obtain

et

=

-

e

+

'"

(1-A)L...,
"').)£ t-).
j=O

+
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.}/it-).
I 1 L...,
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(A14)

If the

E

and .1 shocks are independently and identically distributed, then the unconditi0l1al

variance of e is:

(1 1.)2

-'--~Var(£) +

1-1.2

1. 2

1

(1-1.)2 1-1.2

Var(~)

(AI5)

To obtain the unconditional variance of the change in the exchange rate, use (AI4) and again
assume independently and identically distributed shocks with zero means. The result is:

(AI6)

With very little speculation and Aclose to zero, the variance of the change in the exchange rate is
twice the variance of the level. With a lot of speculation and A close to one, the variance of the
change in the exchange rate is about the same as the variance in the level.

Uniqueness of Constant Solution
Our solution for the conditional variance of the exchange rate assumes that Q/ is a
constant Q. However, since so many relationships are nonlinear, the uniqueness of the solution
cannot be assumed. From Q = Nq and from the definition of q in equation (7),

Q = NI[OVar(e,+,)]

(AI?)

From equation (22) for the exchange rate's conditional variance, combined with (A9), we get:

(A.l8)

Equations (A.9), (A.17), and (A.18) are three equations in Q, A and Var(el+l)
given Var(E t+I ),

Var(~t+I)' S,

e, and N as exogenous parameters.

Eliminating Q and Var(e t+ l ) we

have:

N

(A.19)

8S

The right side of (A. 19) becomes arbitrarily small as A approachees zero, and becomes arbitrarily
large as A approaches unity. It is also monotonically increasing in A. Therefore, for any value of
the left side of (A.19), there is only one solution for A. By (A.9), there is then only one solution
for Q and by (A.18) there is only one solution for Var(e t+ 1). Furthermore, one can readily see
from (A.9) and (A.19) that A and Q are unambiguously higher when N is higher.

A.III. Autocorrelated Current-Account Shocks

If £t = P £t-I + (Ot' then (A.12) can be used to get an explicit solution. Note first that
(A.20)

With these substitutions, the terms in (A.12) involving E shocks can be written

..
L )./(pie,
j=O

- Api'lE t • 1)

This was used to obtain equation (25) in the text.
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A.IV. Mean-Reverting Interest-Rate Differentials
If 0 1 = M I_I + TlI' we need to replace !i.1+) by
01-

°=
101

(a-I)

01_1

° °
1+) -

1+)0 1

in (A. 12). Then note that
(A.22)

+ TlI

(A.23)
(A.24)
(A.25)
With these substitutions in (A.I2), the summations for interest-rate changes reduce to

(1-A)(1-o:) 0
I-O:A
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+

I-A
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This was used to generate equation (27) in the text.

(A.27)
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